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NFL CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS IN THE
AFTERMATH OF
WHITE v. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE'

INTRODUCTION

The 1990's has been a decade of labor strife between ownership
and players in professional football, basketball and baseball.
Television revenues, advertising dollars and licensing agreements
now have enormous ramifications as the popularity of professional
sports has reached an all-time high worldwide. This rise in
popularity in the United States and abroad has brought with it a
substantial increase in the amount of money earned by professional
sports franchises, and subsequently, the money paid to the
professional athletes who play for them. Numerous strikes,
lockouts and court battles have been waged as the parties jockey
for control of those dollars. Every dispute has an effect on the
advertisers, owners, players and agents. They impact everyone
involved with professional sports at any level, from the sports fan
to the hot dog vender.
Most recently, professional football players brought a class
action antitrust suit against the National Football League ("NFL").
A Special Master was assigned to settle two specific disputes
arising out of two separate contract negotiations. The first dispute
arose out of a contract renegotiation between Billy Joe Hobert and
the Buffalo Bills. The second dispute arose from a contract
negotiated between Elvis Grbac and the Kansas City Chiefs
Football Club. The Special Master determined that the Hobert
contract renegotiation, which changed the compensation terms of
the original contract without extending the time period covered,
violated the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement ("SSA")
between the National Football League Players Association
("NFLPA") and the NFL. Similarly, the Special Master ruled the
Grbac contract, which contained a likely to be earned ("LTBE")
1. 972 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Minn. 1997) (hereinafter White IV).
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voidable season, violated the SSA between the NFLPA and the
NFL. The NFLPA and Class counsel appealed to the U. S. District
Court, District of Minnesota, Fourth Division. The district court
held that the Hobert contract was authorized. The contract
between Grbac and the Kansas City Chiefs was also found to be
valid because there was nothing in the language of the SSA nor the
NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") that would
prohibit a LTBE voidable clause in a contract. In so holding, the
District Court reversed the ruling of the Special Master.
BACKGROUND

The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota's
history with National Football League labor issues began when
football players brought a class action 2 antitrust suit on September
21, 1992, seeking complete free agency.3 Class counsel and NFL
representatives reached a tentative agreement to settle that action
on January 6, 1993. Once the negotiations were completed, the
final document that expressed the substance of that agreement was
the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement ("SSA").' Twenty-eight
NFL players6 , one Contract Advisor,7 sixteen college players8 and
2. The class included 4,957 NFL players that were either current or former
NFL players at the time the action was brought.
3. White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1394 (D. Minn.
1993) (hereinafter White 1).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1394 n. 5.
6. Id. at 1398 n. 11. At the deadline for filing objections, April 2, 1993, the
following active or former NFL players had filed objections: Wilber Marshall,
Paul Gruber, Brian Washington, Carl Lee, Mark Dusbabek, Audray McMillian,
Felix Wright, Cody Risien, Mark Harper, Sammy Martin, Mike Farr, Pepper
Johnson, Don Beebe, Gregory Scales, Gregory J. Baty, Barry Sanders, Luis
Sharpe, Steve Atwater, Horatio Benny Blades, James Hasty, Byron Evans,
Michael C. Johnson, Reggie Langhorne, Maurice Hurst, John Fourcade, Sean
Jones, Eric Allen, Leslie ONeal, Eric Sanders, Ken Norton, Jr., Curtis Duncan,
Patrick Hunter, William C. Matthews, Cris Dishman, Lomas Brown, Neff Smith,
Van Waiters, Broderick Thompson, Terry Orr, Shane Collins, Ron Middleton,
Mark Schlereth, Kelly Goodburn, David Gulledge, Ed Simmons, Matt Elliott, Joe
Jacoby, Sidney Johnson, Kurt Gouveia, Ravin Caldwell, Mark Rypien, James
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/6
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one NFL club9 objected to the acceptance of the SSA. The District
Court overruled those objections and enjoined all other pending
cases brought by individuals on the same issues on April 30,
1993.10
After the January 6, 1993 tentative agreement was reached, the
NFLPA took steps to reestablish its role as the collective
bargaining representative for all NFL players. 1 A majority of
players who had finished the 1992 season on NFL rosters, voted to
Jenkins, Johnny Thomas, Eric Williams, Don Warren, John Elliott, Duane Bickett
and Steve Young.
After April 2, 1993, additional objections were filed on behalf of Brian
Blades, Roland James, Pat Carter, Kenneth F. Ruettgers, Jerry Ball, Jeff Bostic,
Todd Bowles, Ray Brown, Jason Buck, Earnest A. Byner, Desmond Howard,
Anthony Johnson, Brian Mitchell, Ricky Sanders and Paul Siever.
At the hearing, the court granted all motions to extend time, ruling that all
objections filed as of the hearing date, April 16, 1993, would be considered by the
court, whether such objections were timely filed or not. The court further ruled that
April 16, 1993, was the deadline for objections, and that it would not consider any
objections filed after that date.
The Tice action, another case involving preseason claims, was originally filed
in the District of Columbia, and transferred to the Minnesota district court by order
of Judge Royce C. Lamberth dated February 10, 1993. Tice v. Pro Football Inc.,
812 F.Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1993). Tice, Civ. No. 4-93-166 (D.Minn. transferred
Feb. 10, 1993). At the preliminary approval hearing, some of the Tice plaintiffs
objected to the settlement of the preseason pay claims within the context of White.
Those objections, however, were withdrawn for purposes of final approval of the
settlement.
7. White 1, 822 F. Supp. at 1398 n. 13. Robert J. Sheridan, who represents the
sixteen college player-objectors, filed the objection purportedly on behalf of
himself, attorney-agents and all other present and future agents similarly
situated.
8. Id. at 1398 n 12. One college player, Brian Pressler, filed a timely
objection, purportedly on behalf of himself and all other present and future
"college and other football players" similarly situated. Untimely objections
were filed on behalf of college players Jesse Becton, Scott Brown, Rudy
Thompson, Ernie Lewis, Eugene Brown, Percy Coleman, James Chinn, Ron
Alexander, Brad LaCombe, Dan Purcell, Steve Ross, Ron Moran, Steve
Robinson, Garrett Washington and Bennie Hargro.
9. Id. at 1397 n. 10. The Philadelphia Eagles objected to the NFI's recognition
of the NFLPA as a labor union and to any potential settlement of a related dispute
over licensing agreements. NFLPA v. NFL Properties, No. 90-CV-4244
(S.D.N.Y.) (filed June 25, 1990).
10. Id. at 1399
11. Id. at 1435
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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authorize the NFLPA as the players representative for the purpose
of collective bargaining. 2
On March 31, 1993, the NFLPA and representatives of the NFL
Management Council ("NFLMC"), the multi-employer bargaining
unit of the NFL owners, began negotiating in an effort to reach a
new collective bargaining agreement.13 Those negotiations remained
ongoing as of April 30, 1993, on which date the court granted final
approval of the original Stipulation and Settlement Agreement. 4
The court order of April 30, 1993, made several findings concerning
The court determined: 1) the NFLPA had been
the NFLPA.'
lawfully formed; 2) neither the NFL nor the players had taken action
that would hinder the NFLPA's role as the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the players; 3) the NFL clubs had
recognized the NFLPA as the exclusive representative for the
players; and 4) as a result the NFLPA is authorized to enter into a
collective bargaining agreement with the NFL. 6
The original settlement agreement anticipated that the parties
might reach a new collective bargaining agreement which would
include the player movement rules laid out in the settlement
12. White I, 822 F. Supp. at 1435 (citing letter from Richard A. Berthelsen,
General Counsel of the NFLPA, to Paul Tagliabue, Commissioner of the NFL

(March 23, 1993)).
13. Id. at 1397.
14. Id. at 1397n. 9.
15. The specific language of the April 30, 1993 order concerning the NFLPA

is laid out in the following four points:
(1) The NFLPA has been lawfully formed and selected by the
players to serve as the exclusive collective bargaining
representative of all present and future NFL players.
(2) Neither the NFL nor any of its members have taken any
action which in any way hindered or supported the formation of
the NFLPA as the exclusive collective bargaining representative
of all present and future NFL players.
(3)The NFL and its member clubs have lawfully recognized the
NFLPA as the players' exclusive collective bargaining
representative.
(4) Accordingly, the NFLPA is fully authorized and empowered
to enter into a new collective bargaining agreement with the
NFL and its member clubs.
Id. at 1435-36.
16. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/6
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agreement.17 Therefore, the court did not enter final judgment on its
April 30, 1993 order in the hope the ongoing meetings between the
NFL and NFLPA would result in such an agreement.
The NFLPA and the NFL reached an agreement on the terms of a
new collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") on May 6, 1993.19
The various lawsuits regarding the NFLPA's group licensing
program also reached final settlement on that date.20 An agreement
was made to amend various provisions of the SSA and the plaintiffs
moved the court to approve those amendments resulting from the
negotiations.21 Additionally, the parties made a joint motion
requesting that the court reconfirm its prior findings and make
further factual findings concerning the NFLPA's status, scope and
applicability of the nonstatutory labor exemption.22
The nonstatutory labor exemption exempts certain anticompetitive
union-employer activities from antitrust sanctions.' The Supreme
Court has recognized that in order to properly accommodate the
congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets
with the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under
the National Labor Relations Act,24 certain union-employer
agreements must be accorded a limited, nonstatutory exemption
2
from antitrust sanctionsY.
Generally, whether the nonstatutory
exemption will protect a particular agreement turns upon whether the
relevant federal labor policy is deserving of preeminence over
federal6 antitrust policy under the circumstances of the particular
2
case.
17. White I, 836 F. Supp. at 1465.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id. at 1466.
Id.
Id.
White I, 822 F. Supp. at 1466.

23. White v. National Football League, 836 F. Supp. 1458, 1465 (D. Minn.
1993) (hereinafter White 11).

24. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
25. White II, 836 F. Supp. at 1465.
26. Powell v. National Football League, 678 F. Supp. 777, 782 (D. Minn.1988)
(citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 888 F.2d 559, 568 (8th Cir.),
supersededby, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040,

(1991).

See generally Daniel J. Gifford, Redefining the Antitrust Labor

Exemption, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1379, 1404-08 (1988) (detailing history of the
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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The players and the NFLPA originally sought to terminate the
collective bargaining relationship so that the players would be free
to pursue their antitrust claims.27 The court entered an order on
May 23, 1991, determining that various actions taken by the
players and the NFLPA resulted in the termination of the NFLPA's
"status as a labor organization" sometime in November or
December of 1989.8 On June 12, 1991, the Eighth Circuit denied
the NFL's motion for interlocutory appeal of the district court's
determination in McNeil v. National Football League that the
NFLPA had ceased to function as a labor union.29 As a result, eight
players were able to pursue their antitrust claims in
individual
30
McNeil.
While the court's holding in McNeil opened the door for the
players antitrust claims, once the parties reached a tentative global
settlement in January of 1993, the Board of the NFLPA immediately
passed a resolution seeking to again become the collective
bargaining representative of the players.3 In mid-January 1993, the
NFLPA began to collect authorization cards from NFL players
designating it as their exclusive collective bargaining
representative."
The district court granted a motion for final approval of the
settlement agreement, 33 application for order and judgment
approving the SSA. 34 Twenty-six football players appealed,
nonstatutory labor exemption); Note, Releasing Superstarsfrom Peonage: Union
Consent and the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption, 104 HARVARD L. REV. 874,
875-78 (1991) (discussing genesis of the nonstatutory labor exemption).
27. White 11, 836 F. Supp. at 1466.
28. Powell v. National Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351, 1356 (D. Minn.
1991). See Pittsburgh Steelers, Inc., No. 6-CA-23143, 1991 WL 144468, at *4
(June 26, 1991). The Associate General Counsel of the NLRB found that "the
NFLPA has effectively disclaimed its representational rights and has converted
itself from a Section 2(5) labor organization to a trade association". Id.
29. McNeil v. National Football League, No. 91-8088 (8th Cir. June 12,
1991).
30. McNeil v. National Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, 881-84 (D. Minn.
1992).
31. White I, 822 F. Supp. at 1425.
32. Id. (the authorization cards indicated that the players were authorizing
the NFLPA as their collective bargaining entity).
33. White II, 836 F. Supp. at 1458.
34. Id. at 1508.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/6
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challenging the district court's certification of a mandatory class,
the approval of the settlement agreement and the enjoinment of
related actions.3" On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court decision on all issues.36 Subsequently, the NFL and
NFLPA adopted the CBA on May 6, 1993. 3"
Two years later, in May of 1995, an expedited determination was
sought from a Special Master on the impact of the SSA for
renegotiated or extended contracts. " The Special Master held that
renegotiated and extended contracts were subject to certain salary
rules under the SSA.39 Class counsel and the NFLPA appealed the
Special Master's holding to the district court40
On appeal, the court addressed the issue of whether the parties
intended that an NFL Player Contract entered into during an
Uncapped League Year, and then later renegotiated or extended
during a Capped League Year, constituted only a modification of the
original NFL Player Contract or a new and distinct NFL Player
Contract for the purposes of applying the thirty percent (30%) Rules
under the SSA.4 ' The district court held that renegotiated or
35. White v. National Football League, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994).
36. Id. at 406
37. White II, 836 F. Supp. at 1465.
38. White v. National Football League, 899 F. Supp. 410 (D. Minn. 1995)
(hereinafter White III).
39. Id.
40. Id. Class Counsel and the NFLPA brought the matter before Special Master
Feerick because the NFLMC had informed the Clubs that the 30% Down Rule in
the SSA and the CBA continued to apply to contract renegotiations or extensions
reached during the Capped 1995 League Year for player contracts originally
executed during the Uncapped 1993 League Year. Class Counsel and NFLPA
sought a ruling by the Special Master that renegotiated or extended contracts
constituted new contracts under the SSA and CBA for the purposes of applying the
30% Rules. The NFLMC filed an opposing brief, and a hearing was held before
Special Master Feerick on May 16, 1995. On May 22, 1995, Special Master
Feerick issued his decision denying the relief requested by Class Counsel and the
NFLPA. He concluded that a 1995 modification or extension of a 1993 Player
Contract remains subject to the 30% Down Rule. Id.
41. The 30% Rules state:
1. No NFL Player Contract entered into in an Uncapped Year
prior to the 1999 League Year may provide for an annual
decrease in Salary, excluding any amount attributable to a
signing bonus as defined in Paragraph G.2(d) above, of more
than 30% of the Salary of the first League Year of the Contract
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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extended player contracts were subject to the SSA and CBA
provisions governing allowable salary decreases in player contracts
entered into in uncapped years.42 This rule prohibited decreases of
more than thirty percent (30%) of the salary of the first league year
contract.43
This line of cases provides the history of the court's experience to
address the circumvention questions brought before the district court
in the most recent action between NFL players and the NFL member
clubs.
FACTS

The NFLPA appealed from two related contract disputes
involving the "circumvention" provisions of Article XV(2) of the
SSA and Article XXV, § 2 of the National Football League
("NFL" or "League") Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA")."
per year.
For example, a four-year Player Contract
commencing in the 1993 League Year may not provide for an
annual decrease of more than 30% of the Salary, excluding
amounts treated as a signing bonus, in the 1993 League Year for
each of the four years covered by the Contract. Id.
2. No NFL Player Contract entered into in a Capped Year and
extending increase in Salary, excluding any amount attributable
to a signing bonus as defined in Paragraph G.2(d) above, of
more than 30% of the Salary provided for in the 1998 League
Year, per year, either in the 1999 League Year or in any
subsequent League year covered by the Player Contract. For
example, a four-year Player Contract signed in the 1998 League
Year (assuming it is a Capped Year) may not provide for an
annual increase of more than 30% of the 1998 League Year
Salary, excluding amounts treated as a signing bonus, in each of
the three additional League Years covered by the Contract.
SSA, art. X, H. See CBA, art. XXIV, § 8.
42. White III, 899 F. Supp. at 410.
43. Id.
44. White v. National Football League, 972 F. Supp. 1230, *1 (D. Minn.
1997) (hereinafter White IV). Those provisions provide in their relevant part:
"Neither the parties hereto, nor any Club or players shall enter into any
agreement, Player Contract, Offer Sheet or other transaction which includes any
terms that are designed to serve the purpose of defeating or circumventing the
intention of the parties as reflected by (a) the provisions of this Agreement with
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/6
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I. Hobert Dispute
The first dispute concerned the renegotiation of Billy Joe
Hobert's Player Contract. Hobert signed a four year contract with
the Oakland Raiders in 1996 that included a $700,000 Signing
Bonus." Before the 1997 season began, however, Hobert was
traded to the Buffalo Bills. The trade transferred Hobert's
obligation to complete the remaining three years of the contract
that he entered into with the Raiders in 1996. 46
The Bills and Hobert agreed to renegotiate the remaining three
years, 1997-1999 League Years, of his Player Contract.47 Under
the original terms of Hobert's contract with the Raiders he was
scheduled to be paid a Paragraph 5,48 or base salary, of $760,000 in
1997, $1,250,000 in 1998, and $1,500,000 for the 1999 League
Years. 49 The 1997 League Year compensation did not include a
signing bonus. The proposed renegotiated contract between the
Bills and Hobert included a $235,000 Paragraph 5 salary and a
$525,000 Signing Bonus for the 1997 season. Hobert's base salary
for the 1998 and 1999 league years would be $1,250,000 and
$1,490,000 respectively.5"
Because a Paragraph 5 salary is not guaranteed, it is possible that
Hobert's 1997 earnings could be substantially less than $760,000.51
In fact, the salary could go unearned altogether. 2 Typically, the
respect to the Defined Gross Revenues, Salary Cap, Entering Player Pool, and
Minimum Team Salary, and (b) any other term and provision of this Agreement.
However, any conduct permitted by this Agreement shall not be considered to
be a violation of this provision." Id.
45. Id.at 1231.
46. Id.at 1232.
47. Id.
48. Paragraph 5 compensation, or base salary, is the compensation set forth
in paragraph 5 of an NFL Player Contract. Paragraph 5 compensation is not
guaranteed, and is paid in weekly installments over the playing season. CBA

Art. I, § 3(a).
49. White IV,972 F. Supp. at 1232.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Hobert was, in fact, released by the Bills on October 15 of the 1997
League Year and, therefore, did not earn all of the negotiated 1997 Paragraph 5
salary. Id.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

9

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6

DEPAULJ.ART&ENT. LAW

[Vol. VIII:115

only guaranteed compensation in an NFL contract comes in the
form of a signing bonus. Under the proposed renegotiation, Hobert
would be paid a $525,000 Signing Bonus in 1997."3 The remaining
$235,000 of the $760,000 would be paid as Paragraph 5
compensation and disbursed to Hobert throughout the 1997
season. 4 The proposed restructured contract would also include a
$10,000 pay cut in the Paragraph 5 salary during the 1999 League
Year."
When calculating a player's salary cap value for any given
season, a Signing Bonus and Paragraph 5 compensation are treated
differently. Signing Bonuses are prorated over the full term of a
Player Contract.16 Conversely, Paragraph 5 compensation is
included, for salary cap purposes, by NFL Clubs "in the year
earned. 5 7 The effect on the Bills' salary calculation for Hobert's
proposed renegotiated contract can be contrasted with the original
contract Hobert was under when he was traded. Hobert's original
contract would have cost the Bills $760,000 against their salary cap
in 1997, $1,250,000 in 1998 and $1,500,000 in the 1999 League
Year. Hobert's renegotiated contract would cost an additional
$410,000 against the Bills' 1997 cap, 8 $1,425,00 against the 1998
cap and $1,650,000 against the cap for the 1999 League Year. 9
The proposed renegotiated contract would provide at least two
benefits to Hobert.6 ° First, Hobert would be guaranteed $525,000
for the 1997 League Year.61 Second, the proposed Signing Bonus
would provide an incentive for the Bills to keep Hobert on their
roster for the entire term of the renegotiated contract.6" If Hobert
53. White IV,972 F. Supp. at 1237.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. SSA art. X(G)(2)(a); CBA art. XXIV, § 7(b)(I).
57. SSA art. X(G)(1)(a); CBA art. XXIV, § 7(a)(I).
58. In accordance with the SSAICBA proration rules, only $410,000
($235,000 of Paragraph 5 compensation plus $175,000 of Signing Bonus)
would be counted against the Bills' 1997 Salary Cap. The remaining $350,000
of the proposed $525,000 Signing Bonus would be prorated over the 1998 and
1999 League Years. Id.
59. White IV, 972 F. Supp. at 1237.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/6
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were released before the conclusion of the proposed contract, the
Bills' Salary Cap recognition of the $525,000 Signing Bonus
would be accelerated to the then-current League Year.6' The
renegotiation would also provide the Bills with an additional
$350,000 of room under the salary cap in 1997. 6' However, the
Bills would have $175,000 less to spend on other players during
the 1998 and 1999 League Years under the terms of the
renegotiated contract because $350,000 of Hobert's Signing Bonus
would be prorated over those League Years.6"
The Hobert dispute arose when the National Football League
Management Council ("NFLMC") informed the Bills' that they
would not accept the proposed renegotiation of Hobert's contract
unless Hobert agreed to extend his Player Contract for an
additional year.
The NFLMC asserted that without such an
extension, the contract violated the "circumvention" provisions of
the SSA and CBA.66
II. GrbacDispute
The second dispute involves Elvis Grbac, a quarterback for the
Kansas City Chiefs who signed a five year contract. 67 Grbac's
contract provides for a $3,500,000 signing bonus which then would
be prorated over the full term of the Player Contract. 68 The fifth
year of the contract is voidable at Grbac's option upon the
occurrence of any combination of several contingencies.69

63. SSA art. X(G)(2)(b); CBA art. XXIV, § 7(b)(ii). As previously noted,
Hobert was released during the 1997 League Year. Consequently, the
hypothetical proposed by the court was realized and the entire $525,000 signing
bonus will be recognized against the 1997 League Year salary cap for the

Buffalo Bills.
64. White IV, 972 F. Supp. at 1237.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. The contract contains the following language:
"1. If the Player is on the Active/Inactive 53-man roster, the
PUP, NFI, IR or any other employment or league list (except
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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The NFLMC informed the Chiefs and Grbac that the Signing
Bonus could not be prorated over the "voidable" year of the
contract unless Grbac agreed to specific changes.7" The NFLMC
asserted that because the incentives that would allow Grbac to void
the fifth year of the contract were likely to be earned ("LTBE"),7"
the Chiefs could only prorate Grbac's Signing Bonus over the first
four years of the contract at a level of $875,000. The NFLMC
offered the Chiefs the option to change the incentives for the
voidable year in Grbac's contract to make them not likely to be
earned ("NLTBE")72 in order to prorate the Signing Bonus over the
full five League Years of the contract. If the NFLMC changes
were accepted by Grbac and the Chiefs it would have a dual effect.
First, the Chiefs would have $175,000 less per season to sign other
players in the 1997-1999 League Years. Second, Grbac would lose
his unilateral right to void the final year of the contract if he met
the LTBE incentives. 3 Grbac was unwilling to accept the NFLMC
Reserve/DNR, Reserve/left squad) for the last game of the
2000 NFL season.
AND
2. Any of the following contingencies are met during 1997,
1998, 1999 or 2000 NFL regular seasons.
A. Player participates in at least 20% of the team's offensive
plays, exclusive of special team plays in any single season.
B. Player passes for at least 800 yards in any single season.
C. Player completes as least 9 or more touchdown passes in
any single season.
D. Player's QB rating is at least 73 in any single season.
E. Club qualifies for post-season play in any single season.
THEN
Player has the express right to terminate (void) his contract for
the year 2001 within 30 days subsequent to the last game of
the 2000 regular season. Player must notify the club of his
right to terminate the 2001 contract by fax, personal delivery,
or certified mail to club's president or general manager."
White IV, 972 F. Supp. at 1233.
70. Id.
71. Any incentive that is within the player's sole control subject to various
guidelines. CBA art. XXIV § 7c(iii) p. 100-123.
72. White IV, 972 F. Supp. at 1233. Any incentive that is not within the
player's sole control and does not meet the criteria set out in the CBA guidelines
as amended.
73. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/6
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proposal and the conflict was turned over to the Special Master for
a ruling.74
The NFLPA and Class Counsel argued that the Hobert
renegotiation and the Grbac contract did not violate the
"circumvention" provisions in the SSA and CBA. 7' The issues
were fully briefed and argued before Special Master Friedenthal.76
The Special Master issued his decision on May 30, 1997,
concluding that the Hobert renegotiation and Grbac contract
circumvented the intent of the parties to the SSA.7 7 The NFLPA
and Class Counsel filed a timely appeal in the United States
Federal Court District of Minnesota, Fourth Division.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

The district court addressed two preliminary issues raised by the
NFL Management Council. The NFLMC argued that the district
court did not have proper jurisdiction and that the standard of
review should be a clearly erroneous standard. The court then
proceeded to discuss in detail the Circumvention Rule in the
context of the Hobert and Grbac contracts.
L Jurisdiction
The court noted its jurisdiction is based on the "well-established
principle that a trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce consent
decrees and settlement agreements., 78 The Stipulation and
Settlement Agreement, the document under which the NFLMC and
NFLPA brought this dispute, provides that "the Court shall retain
jurisdiction over this Action to effectuate and enforce the terms of
this Agreement and the Final Consent Judgment."79 The court held
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. White IV, 972 F. Supp. at 1233.
78. Beckett v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 995 F.2d 280, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
79. SSA art. XX.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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that "unless and until the Final Consent Judgment is modified, the
court has the power to enforce the terms of the SSA."8°

I1 Standardof Review
The NFLMC also argued that the terms of the SSA, in particular
the Circumvention provision, are ambiguous." Consequently, the
NFLMC contended the proper standard of review is the clearly
erroneous standard. This directly contrasted Class Counsel and the
NFLPA argument that the court should review the Special Master's
decision de novo" The district court looked to the language of the
SSA and the CBA to determine what standard should be invoked.83
The SSA and CBA provisions regarding review provide that the
court shall review the Special Master's recommendations under the
clearly erroneous standard.84 The district court determined that,
from the plain reading of the SSA and CBA, the Special Master's

80. White, 972 F. Supp. at 1234.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. The powers of the Court and the Special Master and the rights of the
parties in any enforcement proceedings shall be as set forth in Rules 53(a), (c),
(d) and (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided, however, that:
(b) The Court shall accept the Special Master's findings of
fact unless clearly erroneous and the Special Master's
recommendations of relief unless based upon clearly
erroneous findings of fact, incorrect application of law, or
abuse of discretion; except that, as to any finding concerning
Article XXVII (Anti-Collusion), any imposition of a fine of
$1 million or more, or any finding that would permit
termination of this Agreement, review shall be de novo;
(c) Subject to subsections (a) and (b) above, the Court shall
determine all points of law and finally make the award of all
relief including, without limitation, contract damages,
contempt and specific performance.
SSA art. XXII(2); CBA art. XXVI, § 2.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/6
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factual findings were to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard." Any conclusions of law would be reviewed de novo. 8'
The court noted the SSA specifically provides that "[t]he parties
shall not, in any proceeding ... use or refer to any parole evidence
' 87
with regard to the interpretation or meaning of... this Agreement.
Therefore, the Special Master's decision was restricted to
interpreting the language used in the SSA as a matter of law.88 As
a result,
the court reviewed the Special Master's decision de
9
8

novo.
II

The Circumvention Rule

The district court addressed three issues in its decision. The first
dealt with over-reaching and whether conduct that is permitted by
the SSA can violate the Circumvention Rule.9" Then the court
evaluated the meaning of "circumvention" as it relates to the
specific conflicts involved in the Hobert and Grbac contracts.91
The conflict surrounding the Hobert renegotiation presented the
issue of whether a Player Contract that is restructured to decrease
Paragraph 5 base compensation and to increase a Signing Bonus
without being extended constitutes "circumvention."" The Grbac
conflict was slightly more complex.
It presented the issue of
whether it constitutes "circumvention" for a Signing Bonus to be
prorated over a year of a Player Contact that is voidable at the
player's option if incentives that are based upon events which are
not within the player's "sole control" even though LTBE, are
achieved.9" Simply put, the Hobert and Grbac disputes focused on

85. White, 972 F. Supp. at 1234.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1235.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. White IV, 972 F. Supp. at 1235.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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the narrow issue concerning the payment and proration of signing
bonuses.94
The district court looked to the language of the Circumvention
Rule to address the first issue. The Circumvention provision of the
SSA and CBA provides that a player contract may not be entered
into that is designed to circumvent or defeat the terms of those
agreements. 95
The SSA and CBA are governed by New York law,96 which
requires "the terms of a contract must be construed so as to give
effect to the intent of the parties as indicated by the language of the
contract." 97 When interpreting a written contract, the principle
objective is to determine "the intention of the parties as derived
from the language employed."98 It is the court's responsibility to
give the words of a contract their ordinary meaning unless the
context requires otherwise.9 9 It is not in the court's discretion to
rewrite, add or subtract language that was not in the contract as
written."° The court used these principles as the framework to
interpret the relevant portions of the SSA.01
A. HobertDispute

94. Id.
95. Neither the parties hereto, nor any Club or player shall enter into any
agreement, Player Contract, Offer Sheet or other transaction which includes any
terms that are designed to serve the purpose of defeating or circumventing the
intention of the parties as reflected by (a) the provisions of this Agreement with
respect to the Salary Cap, Entering Player Pool, and Minimum Team Salary, and
(b) any other term and provision of this Agreement. However, any conduct

permitted by this Agreement shall not be considered a violation of this
provision. SSA art. XV(2); CBA art. XXV, § 2.
96. White IV, 972 F. Supp. at 1235.
97. Slatt v. Slatt, 64 N.Y.2d 966, 967 (1985).
98. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Wesolowski, 33 N.Y.2d 169,
171-72 (1973) (quoting S. Williston, A Treatiseon the Law of Contracts § 600,
at 280 (3d ed.1961)).
99. See Laba v. Carey, 29 N.Y.2d 302, 308, mot. for rearg den., 30 N.Y.2d

694 (1971).
100. Slatt, 64 N.Y.2d at 967; White III, 899 F.Supp. at 414-415 (D.Minn.
1995).
101. WhiteIV, 972 F. Supp. at 1236.
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The CBA and SSA set forth rules intended to govern Player
Contract renegotiations and extensions. The court looked
specifically to these rules to determine if the Hobert renegotiation
was within the parameters allowed by the CBA and SSA rules. 2
The CBA defines "renegotiate" as any change in the Salary or
the terms under which such Salary is earned or paid."°3 "Salary" is
defined as any compensation of money, property, investments,
loans, or anything else of value that a Club pays to, or is obligated
to pay to, a player ...
during a League Year, as calculated in
accordance with the rules set forth in Article XXIV (Guaranteed
League-wide Salary, Salary Cap & Minimum Team Salary)."'"
According to the definitions in the CBA and SSA, Paragraph 5
Salary is "included in Team Salary in the year earned."'0 5 This is
contrasted with the CBA and SSA definition for a Signing Bonus
where, the total amount of any Signing Bonus shall be prorated
over the term of the Player Contract in determining Team and

102. SSA art. X(I) provides:
I. Renegotiations and Extensions
Provided that all Salary Cap requirements are met, Player
Contracts for current and future years may be renegotiated
and/or extended as follows:
1. The contract of a Veteran Player may not be renegotiated
to increase the Salary to be paid to the player during the
original terms of the contract for a period of twelve months
after the player's most recent contract negotiation. The first
renegotiation of a Veteran Player Contract, however, may take
place at any time.
2. No Salary and player may agree to renegotiate any term
of a previously signed Player Contract for a prior League
Year.
3. No contract renegotiations may be done for a current
season after the last regular season game of that season.
4. A Player Contract signed by a Rookie may not be
renegotiated except as provided in Article V (Entering Player
Pool), paragraph 2.
5. As provided in Article IX (Final Eight Plan),
paragraphs 3 and 4.
SSA art. X(I); CBA art. XXIV, § 9.
103. SSA art. I(al); CBA art. I, § 2(ab).
104. SSA art. I(v); CBA art. I, § l(k).
105. SSA art. X(G)(1); CBA art. XXIV, § 7(a)(I).
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Player Salary."' The relevant definitions for purposes of
determining Team Salary and salary107 cap calculation are
specifically outlined in the SSA and CBA.
The court looked to these definitions in making its determination
as to whether the Hobert renegotiation violated the Circumvention
Rule. It was determined that, "the plain and unambiguous
language of the relevant portions of the SSA permit a Player
Contract to be restructured to decrease Paragraph 5 compensation
and to increase a Signing Bonus for the then-current League Year
without being extended." ' 8 The court noted the express language
set forth in the SSA and CBA which states that "Player Contracts
for current and future years may be renegotiated and/or
extended." ' 9 The disjunctive "or" makes it clear a player may
either renegotiate and extend his contract or renegotiate his
contract without extending it.10 The court aptly noted the CBA
and SSA provide that a Signing Bonus, which is included as part of
a player's Paragraph 5 salary, may be paid for a contract
modification."' The court concluded that renegotiating, without
extending, a Player Contract to include a Signing Bonus for the
then-current League Year is permitted under the SSA."'
Therefore, the Hobert renegotiation does not constitute
circumvention." 3
Consequently, the court noted that the Special Master incorrectly
concluded the renegotiated Hobert contract violated the
Circumvention Rule and erroneously interpreted the circumvention
106. SSA art. X(G)(2)(a); CBA art. XXIV, § 7(b)(I).
107. (I) any amount specifically described in a Player Contract as a
signing bonus;
(iii) any consideration, when paid, or guaranteed, for option
years, contact extensions, contract modifications, or
individually negotiated rights of first refusal[.]
SSA art. X(G)(2)(d); CBA art. XXIV, § 7(b)(iv).
108. White IV, 972 F. Supp. at 1236.
109. SSA art. X(I); CBA art. XXIV, § 9.
110. White IV, 972 F. Supp. at 1237.
111. See SSA art. I(v); CBA art. I, § l(k); See SSA Art. X(G)(2)(d); CBA
Art. XXIV, § 7(b)(iv).
112. White IV, 972 F. Supp. at 1237.
113. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/6
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provision to be a Salary Cap requirement.'14 The court reasoned
that, despite NFLMC arguments to the contrary, the plain language
of the SSA and CBA define Signing Bonus as "[a]ny amount
specifically described in a Player Contract as a Signing Bonus" or
for ..., contract
when paid,...,
consideration,
"[a]ny
5
'
in the terms of the
forth
set
Bonus
Signing
modifications."" The
Hobert renegotiation met the definition of a Signing Bonus under
the SSA and CBA.1 6 The court determined the $525,000 can,
therefore, be fully prorated over the remainder of the contract. 7
Despite NFLMC claims that the Hobert contract is a "sham
renegotiation" to free up "bogus Salary Cap room," the court
reasoned the parties to the SSA and CBA may "justifiably rely on
its terms to maximize their respective economic and competitive
interests.""' 8 The court further held that the Hobert contract was
explicitly authorized under the terms of the SSA and, therefore, did
not violate the Circumvention Rule. 19
B. Grbac Dispute
The narrow issue for review by the court in the Grbac dispute
was "whether a Signing Bonus may be prorated over a contract
year which the player has the right to void based upon events not
within his sole control."' 20 As previously noted, the SSA and
CBA provide that a Signing Bonus is generally prorated over the
term of the Player Contract for determining salary cap value for a
given League Year.' The single exception to this rule under the
SSA and CBA is provided where the right to terminate is within
the sole control of the player.'
114. Id.
115. Id.

116. Id.
117. White IV, 972 F. Supp. at 1237.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. SSA art. X(G)(2) provides:
(ii) Any contract year in which the player has the right to

terminate based upon events within his sole control shall not
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The court reasoned from this provision that a "Signing Bonus
may be prorated over any contract year which the player does not
have the right to terminate based upon events within his 'sole
control."' '
The Special Master found that, based on the
undisputed facts, Grbac did not have "sole control" over any of the
player or team performance incentives that were required to be met
before Grbac could exercise his option to void the final year of the
contract. 124
The court held that this determination alone should have ended
the Special Master's inquiry.'25 Because the incentives required to
invoke Grbac's right to void the final year of his Player Contract
were not within his "sole control," the contract did not violate the
Circumvention rule. 126 The court determined the Special Master
ignored the plain language of the SSA and CBA, which permits a
Signing Bonus to be prorated over a voidable contract year subject
only to the "sole control" test.1 27 The Special Master confused the
issue of LTBE incentives as being a corollary of the "sole control"
test.1 21 The district court properly pointed to the plain language of
the SSA and CBA, which do not include LTBE as a criteria for
determining the validity of voidable years for the purposes of
proration in a Player Contract.1 29 The court noted that the SSA and
CBA state "[a] ny and all incentive amounts, included but not
limited to performance bonuses, shall be included in Team Salary
if they are 'likely to be earned' during such League Year," and any
incentive "within the sole control of the player" is deemed "likely
to be earned." 3 ' However, the phrase "likely to be earned" is

be counted as a contract year for purposes of proration. In the
event the NFL and the NFLPA cannot agree upon whether an
option is within the player's sole control, such issue shall be
resolved by the Impartial Arbitrator.
SSA art. X(G)(2)(a)(ii); CBA art. XXIV, § 7(b)(I).

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

White IV, 972 F. Supp. at 1238.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
White IV, 972 F. Supp. at 1238.
Id. See SSA art. X(G)(2)(a)(ii); CBA art. XXIV, § 7(b)(I).
SSA art. X(G)(3)(a); CBA art. XXIV, § 7(c)(I).
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conspicuously absent from the relevant section of the SSA
pertaining to the proration of Signing Bonuses.
The court reasoned that employing different language in
different sections of the SSA, clearly indicates that the NFLPA and
NFLMC recognized and understood the difference between "sole
control" and "likely to be earned."13 ' Had the parties intended
"likely to be earned" to be the test for the proration of Signing
Bonuses over voidable contract years, they could have so agreed.'32
Consequently, the district court reversed the Special Master's
ruling and held the Grbac contract provision was valid under the
terms of the SSA and CBA.
IMPACT

The court relied on its considerable history of decisions and
experience regarding the current NFL labor agreement and
determined that the Hobert contract was authorized under the terms
of the SSA and CBA between the NFLPA and NFL. The contract
between Grbac and the Kansas City Chiefs was also found to be
valid because there was nothing in the language of the SSA nor the
NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement that would prohibit a likely
to be earned voidable clause in a contract. In so holding, the
district court reversed the ruling of the Special Master.
This ruling has profound importance and will have a significant
impact on upcoming contract negotiations. This is particularly
important in light of the possible effect on the "safety valve"'33
built into the CBA extension, the ongoing television negotiations
and the inevitable league expansion in 1999. Some have argued
there is a possibility that the safety valve will be exercised by one
131. White IV, 972 F. Supp. at 1239.
132. Id.

133. The Safety Valve in the current extension allows for two scenarios by
which either side, the NFL or NFLPA, can shorten the extension: 1) by one
year by giving notice in December of 1997, or 2) by two years by giving notice
in December of 1998. If notice is given then the cap will be reduced back to
62% in the remaining years. Attachment to Letter from Gene Upshaw,
President of the National Football League Players Association, "Open Letter to
NFL Players" (December 20, 1996).
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or both sides. Small market NFL franchises say they cannot keep
up with the large market clubs.'3 4 They note that low-revenue
teams pay players about seventy percent (70%) of their total
revenue while high revenue clubs may only pay players thirty
percent (30%) of the franchises revenue. 135 This is dispite the fact
that NFL teams share more revenue than any other major
professional sport. 136 Although those figures may well be accurate,
the competitive balance in the NFL during the 1996-97 season
swung in favor of the small market franchise when the Green Bay
Packers and the New England Patriots met in Super Bowl XXXI.
While there are those who would argue the current CBA is not
good for football clubs there are also those who maintain it is not
good for the players. They contend the current agreement has
created a class system within teams. 37 The argument essentially
asserts that teams are not willing to keep high priced or "middleclass" veterans as back-ups on teams because of salary cap
constraints. 138 This, in turn, creates a lower-class of younger
players filling in as back-ups making the base minimum.1 39 This
argument fails to recognize that players may have anywhere from
as few as three to as many as six years to earn a starting or
If they have not
contributing position on an NFL roster. 4
134. Stefan Fatsis, Is a Battle Looming Over Salary Caps, WALL ST. J., July
25, 1997, at B9.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Jerry Vanisi, NFL Labor Agreement is a Slave to Television,
PRO FOOTBALL WEEKLY, November 2, 1997, at 47. Vanisi is a former General
Manager with the Chicago Bears. Currently he practices sports law in Chicago
as a player agent.
138. Id.
139. Id. The Paragraph 5 base minimums for the 1997-98 league year is
$131,000 for a rookie, $164,000 for a second year player, and $196,000 for a
third year player. This would not include prorated signing bonuses, LTBE's and
NLTB's. There are very few players in their first three years who make active
NFL rosters and are being paid at solely the base minimum.
140. Id. Players are granted two seasons of practice squad eligibility where
they can be paid significantly below the rookie base minimum while they
develop their skills. After a player eams three accrued seasons he is eligible for
restricted free agency. There are strong deterrents to signing a restricted free
agent such as draft compensation to be given to the players original team by the
signing team and the fact the player's original team holds the right to match any
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/6
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managed to contribute in a significant manner by that point in their
career, then teams move on to the next draft class giving younger
players a chance to develop and earn an opportunity to play in the
NFL.
The facts show that the current system continues to cause
seventy percent (70%) of NFL revenue to be paid to the players in
the form of compensation and benefits.141 Contrary to media
perceptions, there are more older players on current NFL rosters
than in any year preceding the current bargaining agreement's
approval. 142 Among the seven hundred forty nine (749) players
with five or more accrued seasons143 in the league today, only
seventy (70) make the $275,000 minimum. 44 This should be
compared with the situation before the CBA came into effect.
Among players with five or more seasons of experience, six
hundred fifty one (651) players made less than $500,00 in 1992
compared with only one hundred eighty (180) such players in
1997.145
The current labor agreement extension could go through 2002.
As noted, despite criticism, the current agreement has been very
productive for both the players and the teams. The CBA extension
is also important for teams in the negotiation process when
attempting to lure high priced free agents. The final year of the
CBA will be an uncapped season but will require a player to have
six accrued seasons to be eligible for free agency. 46 The
extension, along with this current ruling, will undoubtedly lead to
numerous renegotiations because many contracts had originally
factored in 1999 as an uncapped year under the CBA prior to the
other team's offer. This combination could lead to a player spending as many as
six years with a particular team before he can ever exercise his right to
unrestricted free agency.
141. Staff Crosses Country to Visit Teams, THE AUDIBLE, October 1997, at
1. (The Audible is the official newsletter of the NFLPA).
142. Id.
143. For the purposes of the CBA, an accrued season is generally given to a
player for each season he was on, or should have been on, full pay status for a
total of six or more regular season games subject to several conditions. CBA art.
XVII, § 1.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. CBA art. LVI, § 2.
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extension. The ability to renegotiate a veteran contract without
adding additional years creates the benefit of salary cap room for
the team and allows the player to test the free agency sooner
creating a win-win situation.
Continued labor peace is critical with the NFL's new television
contracts being negotiated. The NFL's television contract is, by
far, the richest in sports.147 The current television deal expires after
the 1997-98 season, bringing in $4.4 billion over the past four
years from telecasters ABC, Fox, NBC, ESPN, and TNT.'48
Oakland Raider owner Al Davis has predicted the new television
package will double in value. 149 Industry analysts predict a forty
to fifty percent (40%-50%) increase is more likely. 5 ' Barry Frank,
senior vice-president at International Management Group,
commented, "In my 40 years in the business, it's the best
negotiating stance I can ever remember from a seller." ' Whatever
the final dollars are, it will drive up the salary cap significantly and
give players, agents and teams significantly more dollars that can
be manipulated under the cap with the new rules set down by this
ruling.
It is also very likely the NFL will again expand in 1999, adding
at least one'52 and possibly two more teams.'53 A promise has been
made by the NFL to place a team in Cleveland in 1999. This,
147. Gary Levin, Eye on a Loose Ball at NFL Contract Time, VARIETY,
September 1, 1996 at 29.
148. Jeff Jensen, Tagliabue Sees Big Score Ahead for NFL TV Rights,
ADVERTISING AGE, January 1, 1997 at 3.
149. Id.
150. The Real Super Bowl, Bus. WEEK, February 3, 1997 at 118 (projecting
a 40% increase in the new television contract); Rudy Martzke, NBC Can Expect
Competition, Steep Increasefor NBA Deal,USA TODAY, October 1, 1997, at C2
(quoting leaders of consulting firms as expecting the new television package
increase to be in excess of 50%).
151. See supra note 150.
152. Peter King, Inside The NFL: State of the Game, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
November 3, 1997, at 77 (quoting NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue that it is
likely and expansion team will be put in place in Cleveland in 1999 but the Los
Angeles market may be left open until a later date with other candidates such as
Houston, Mexico City, Vancouver, Toronto and perhaps even a city in
Germany).
153. Timothy W. Smith, Tagliabue Anticipates a Faster NFL Expansion,
N.Y. TIMES, January 25, 1997, at 33.
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coupled with the NFL's reluctance to leave Los Angeles, the
nation's second largest television market, without a team is driving
the NFL to consider expansion.
NFL Commissioner Paul
Tagliabue said that the rapid success of the Carolina and
Jacksonville franchises, along with the promise to Cleveland and
the importance of the Los Angeles, will in all likelihood lead to
expanding the NFL to thirty two (32) teams in 1999.154 The
Carolina and Jacksonville franchises each paid a franchise fee of
$140 million for the opportunity to field a team. 5 The price tag in
1999 will undoubtedly be higher.
This holding could have enormous impact on salary cap
projections and the importance of including voidable years on
long-term contracts to protect marquis players from pricing
themselves out of the market. The importance of renegotiation to
create salary cap room will take on new significance as the current
agreement continues to be extended and the new television deal
comes into effect. Of course, much of the impact of this holding
will be fleshed out in upcoming contract negotiations.

Joseph D. Wright

154. Id.

155. Id.
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